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Agri-environmental programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, provide payments
to livestock and crop producers to generate broadly defined environmental benefits and to help them
comply with federal water quality regulations, such as those that require manure nutrients generated on
large animal feeding operations to be spread on cropland at no greater than agronomic rates. We couch
these policy options in terms of agri-environmental “carrots” and regulatory “sticks,” respectively. The
U.S. agricultural sector is likely to respond to these policies in a variety of ways. Simulation analysis
suggests that meeting nutrient standards would result in decreased levels of animal production, increased
prices for livestock and poultry products, increased levels of crop production, and water quality improve-
ments. However, estimated impacts are not homogeneous across regions. In regions with relatively less
cropland per ton of manure produced, the impacts of these policies are more pronounced. 
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates that agricultural pollution contributes to
60% of impaired streams, 30% of impaired lakes,
15% of the impaired estuaries, and 15% of the im-
paired coastal shoreline assessed (U.S. EPA, 2002a).
All told, more than 11.6 million acres of U.S. rivers
and lakes are considered impaired by excessive
discharge of agricultural pollutants: soil, pesticides,
pathogens, nitrogen, and phosphorus (U.S. EPA,
2002b). U.S. policy makers have adopted carrot-
and-stick approaches to address some of the water
quality problems linked to agricultural production
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and subsequent pollution. Federal funding targeted
toward the mitigation of agricultural impacts on
water quality has increased (“carrots”), and more
stringent water quality regulations have been enacted
pertaining to agricultural production (“sticks”).
Specifically, funding for conservation practices
on animal feeding operations (AFOs) and cropland
through the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP) has been authorized to increase
from 2002 levels of $200 million to more than $1
billion by 2005 [U.S. Department of Agriculture/
Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA/
NRCS), 2002]. EQIP provides agri-environmental
payments to producers in order to generate broadly
defined environmental benefits and to assist pro-
ducers in complying with local, state, and federal
water quality regulations. In addition, EPA has
mandated nutrient standards for the largest AFOs,
known as concentrated animal feeding operations
(CAFOs). These standards essentially require ma-
nure nutrients generated on CAFOs to be spread on
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cropland at a rate no greater than the agronomic
nutrient demand of the crops grown on that land,
inclusive of commercial fertilizer applications. We
couch these policy options in terms of agri-environ-
mental “carrots” and regulatory “sticks,” respec-
tively.
The U.S. agricultural sector is likely to respond
to these carrots and sticks in a variety of ways. A
well-developed literature has examined the effects
of agri-environmental payments for crop producers
and their potential to reduce the environmental
impacts of agricultural production (see, e.g., Cooper
and Keim, 1996; Horan and Claassen, 2001).
Recent national-level studies have also explored the
implications of new water quality regulations for
livestock and poultry production (USDA/NRCS,
2003; Kaplan, Johansson, and Peters, 2003; U.S.
EPA, 2001; Food and Agricultural Policy Research
Institute, 2001). These latter studies predict adverse
economic impacts for affected AFOs, improved
water quality, and increased commodity prices.
Notably missing from the literature are analyses
of how these alternative approaches for improving
water quality might interact across regions and
across crop, livestock, and poultry sectors. Recent
analyses have considered how agri-environmental
payments might affect water quality markets
(Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 2003) or might interact
with other conservation programs, such as Sod-
buster (Giannakas and Kaplan, 2001). However, to
the best of our knowledge, no previous study inves-
tigates the regional interaction of agri-environmental
payments and water quality regulation in an endog-
enous animal and crop production setting.
For example, a corn producer in Iowa might
receive agri-environmental payments in return for
a reduced nitrogen fertilization regime. At the same
time, a nearby swine CAFO might be willing to
purchase the right to spread manure on that farm-
er’s fields at the greatest extent allowable under a
nutrient standard. In addition, because manure
nutrients are not packaged as uniformly as commer-
cial fertilizers, contain pathogens, and are generally
more difficult to handle (Risse et al., 2001), crop
producers may be reluctant to accept manure nutri-
ents in lieu of commercial fertilizers. The willing-
ness of producers to substitute manure nutrients for
commercial fertilizers could play an important role
in the effectiveness of carrot-and-stick approaches
for achieving water quality improvements.
The potential interactions between and adjust-
ments of crop and animal producers, given these
sometimes competing carrot-and-stick incentives,
could also generate secondary price impacts. In
such cases, Berck and Hoffman (2002) suggest a
sector-wide assessment of economic adjustments.
Moreover, because the impetus for these policies is
to reduce adverse impacts on the environment from
agricultural production, we conduct a regional and
sector-wide assessment of potential economic and
environmental implications.
Analysis findings suggest meeting nutrient
standards would result in decreased levels of animal
production, increased prices for livestock and poultry
products, increased levels of crop production, and
water quality improvements. However, estimated
impacts are not homogeneous across regions or
sectors. In regions with relatively less cropland per
ton of manure produced, the impacts of agri-
environmental policies are likely to be more pro-
nounced. Impacts are generally smaller the more
willing crop producers are to substitute manure
nutrients for commercial fertilizers, and are gener-
ally larger the more animal feeding operations must
meet nutrient standards.
Turning to the potential impacts on water quality,
results of this analysis indicate surface water quality
improves under the various scenarios considered.
Overall, nitrogen discharge to ground and surface
water falls by as much as 12.6%, phosphorus dis-
charge falls by more than 30%, sheet and rill erosion
falls by 6.7%, and pesticide discharge falls by 5%.
In several regions, however, there are unantici-
pated economic and water quality impacts. In some
cases, agri-environmental payments to crop, live-
stock, and poultry producers may restrict animal
production. Moreover, the discharge of some agri-
cultural pollutants may increase under some carrot-
and-stick policies. Specifically, by requiring the
spread of manure nutrients at no greater than agro-
nomic rates, nitrogen leaching to groundwater may
increase, and so may the discharge of sediment and
pesticides to surface water in certain areas. Our
results suggest that the use of agri-environmental
payments to encourage the adoption of relatively
benign crop production practices has the potential
to offset many of these unexpected consequences.
The section below presents a regionalized sector
model and illustrates the expected changes in agri-
cultural production and prices given the imposition
of land application constraints for manure nutrients
in the presence of increasing agri-environmental
payments. The next section describes the empirical
analysis of carrot-and-stick approaches to managing
water quality impairments from agricultural pro-
duction. Simulation results are then presented forJohansson and Kaplan A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Environmental Improvement   93
several scenarios, detailing the potential changes in
market conditions, animal and crop sectors, and
water quality. We conclude with a summary of find-
ings and potential implications of key parameters
for improving U.S. water quality.
Simulation Analysis
Those AFOS meeting nutrient standards spread the
manure they generate on cropland at agronomic
rates, or dispose of the manure in some other accept-
able manner. When confined animal production
within a region generates manure nutrients in
excess of the assimilative capacity of the cropland,
it can choose to find additional cropland for spread-
ing, plant crops that consume more nutrients, raise
animals that produce fewer manure nutrients, or re-
duce the number of animals produced.
Consider a national market for a representative
livestock product with conventional supply and
demand functions. The imposition of manure nutri-
ent standards will result in increased costs of pro-
duction for this product, reflecting nonlinear costs
of manure management. In addition, due to increas-
ing output prices for substitute goods throughout
the animal sectors, demand shifts outward, establish-
ing a new market-clearing quantity. The availability
of agri-environmental payments further alters this
market. Government payments lessen the supply
contraction, and with similar responses throughout
the livestock and poultry markets, the demand for
this representative animal product will also shift.
We expect that agri-environmental payments will
reduce the market displacement which would have
occurred after the imposition of nutrient standards.
With respect to higher food prices, consumers are
better off when agri-environmental payments are
available, but not as well off as when nutrient
standards are absent. That said, consumers are also
arguably better off when water quality increases.
What is less discernable from this illustration is the
extent to which animal producers benefit when
agri-environmental payments are provided to AFOs
who meet nutrient standards. Moreover, some
regions will face greater costs than others when
meeting nutrient standards, which will result in var-
iable impacts across the United States.
There are many important parameters influen-
cing agricultural sector and environmental responses
to water quality regulation and agri-environmental
payments. We constrain our analysis to three:
nutrient standards (i.e., manure land application
restrictions), agri-environmental payments, and
manure substitution rates. We first consider a case
when only CAFOs meet nutrient standards. For the
purposes of this analysis, a CAFO is defined as an
AFO with more than 1,000 animal units (Gollehon
et al., 2001). These facilities represent 4.47% of the
total number of AFOs in the United States, and will
soon be required to meet nutrient standards (U.S.
EPA, 2002b).
1 The quantity of manure generated
by CAFOs exceeds 200 million tons, more than
46% of the total from confined animal operations
(table 1).
Regional differences are notable. The percent-
ages of CAFOs in the Southeast and Pacific regions
are significantly higher than in other regions. And
in the Northern Plains, Appalachia, Mountain, and
Pacific regions, CAFOs generate more than 60% of
the region’s manure on confined animal operations.
As adoption of nutrient standards by all AFOs is the
stated goal of the USDA (USDA-EPA, 1999), this
study also considers the case when CAFOs and an
additional 20% of the AFO manure nitrogen and
phosphorus produced in a region meet nutrient
standards. This essentially reflects an increasing
scope of the regulatory stick. Table 1 clearly identi-
fies those regions where meeting nutrient standards
might be more difficult than in others. Appalachia,
Southeast, and Pacific regions have greater manure
generation per acre of cropland than do other
regions. Changes in economic performance through-
out these regions could be the largest when nutrient
standards are imposed due to the relatively high
manure-to-cropland acre ratio. Greater environ-
mental improvement in these regions might also be
expected.
We next select a range of agri-environmental
budgets to represent the carrot approach to inducing
water quality improvements. To distribute payments
to crop and animal producers based on EQIP
provisions, it is assumed that 60% of the budget is
allocated to livestock and poultry production to
offset fixed and variable costs incurred by livestock
and poultry producers when meeting nutrient
standards. This includes manure nutrient testing,
nutrient management plan development, and manure
hauling costs. The remaining 40% of the budget is
allocated to crop producers to encourage the adop-
tion of best management practices on their crop-
land. These practices include residue management,
1  These regulations use a slightly different definition of “CAFO” than
is used in this analysis, defining CAFOs on a head basis by species (rather
than by animal units), and include farms where animals are in contact
with vulnerable water bodies.94   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Operations with Confined Livestock and Manure Distribution, by USDA Farm Production
Region (1997)
USDA Farm
Operations Manure (million tons) CAFO Manure
Concentration
(tons/acre) Production Region
 a  Total AFO % CAFO Total AFO % CAFO 
Northeast   31,350  1.59  39 15.42 0.42
Lake   52,498  1.64  59 25.10 0.39
Corn Belt   71,252  3.18  73 39.55 0.29
Northern Plains   26,087  4.77  65 64.01 0.57
Appalachia   22,776  7.46  66 62.29 2.25
Southeast   12,635 10.79   23 43.31 1.33
Delta   12,252  7.48  19 39.04 0.42
Southern Plains   10,500  7.00  46 38.22 0.56
Mountain     7,780  8.43  33 69.31 0.80
Pacific     7,654 14.85   40 60.55 2.43
Total United States 254,784  4.47 462  46.36 0.64
Source: 1997 U.S. Census of Agriculture (USDA/NASS, 1999).
a States comprising the USDA Farm Production Regions are as follows: Northeast = CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT;
Lake = MI, MN, WI; Corn Belt = IA, IL, IN, MO, OH; Northern Plains = KS, ND, NE, SD; Appalachia = KY, NC, TN, VA, WV;
Southeast = AL, FL, GA, SC; Delta = AR, LA, MS; Southern Plains = OK, TX; Mountain = AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY; and
Pacific = CA, OR, WA.
conservation rotations, and reduced nitrogen fertili-
zation. Three budget levels are examined: $0, $250
million, and $1 billion, to reflect funding levels in-
dicative of authorized EQIP budgets through 2004.
Finally, we choose two manure-nutrient substitu-
tion rates over which to conduct the scenarios for
this analysis. The willingness to substitute manure
nutrients (substitute) is defined as the percentage of
a region’s agronomic demand for nitrogen and
phosphorus (based upon crop requirements in that
region) met by manure nutrients. Currently, 17% of
corn producers and 8% of soybean producers sup-
plement commercial fertilizer with manure as part
of their crop fertilization regime [USDA/Economic
Research Service (ERS), 2003]. While it is unclear
to what extent substitution rates might change as
AFOs adopt nutrient standards, it is realistic to
assume this rate will increase, especially in regions
facing binding nutrient standards. Increasing manure
substitution could result from conservation programs
such as EQIP or direct purchasing of spreading
rights by livestock or poultry producers from crop
producers. Therefore, substitution rates are allowed
to vary between 20% and 30%.
Six scenarios illustrate the economic and envi-
ronmental adjustments which may result from a
carrot-and-stick approach to improve water quality
in the United States. The baseline scenario (BASE)
corresponds to the USDA forecast for crop and
animal production in the year 2010, in the absence
of nutrient standards or agri-environmental pay-
ments. Results are then presented from the case
when crop producers meet 20% of their nutrient
needs using manure generated on CAFOs (C20).
The next two scenarios build on C20, by offering
agri-environmental payments at the $250 million
and $1 billion levels (C20-25 and C20-100), in line
with EQIP funding expectations. Next, to reflect
increased adoption of manure nutrient applications
over time, crop producers are assumed to be willing
to meet 30% of the nutrient needs using manure
generated on CAFOs in the presence of a $1 billion
agri-environmental budget (C30-100). Last, holding
manure substitution constant at 30% and the budget
at $1 billion, we assume an additional 20% of ma-
nure nutrients from previously unregulated AFOs
are spread according to nutrient standards (AFO) to
correspond to an increasing scope of the stick.
The Model
To evaluate the implications of meeting nutrient
standards, we employ a constrained partial equi-
librium, regionalized optimization model of the
U.S. agricultural sector, which seeks to maximize
profits from livestock, poultry, and crop production
in the presence of agri-environmental payments and
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Here, xactrj represents regional production of live-
stock and poultry species j in region r; xactri repre-
sents regional acres planted under cropping enter-
prise i (crop rotation and tillage regime) in region r;
Pj and VCj are equilibrium prices and variable costs
for livestock and poultry products; and Pi and VCi
are equilibrium prices and variable costs for crops.
The model includes fixed costs (FC) essential to
meeting a nutrient standard, transportation costs
(TC) associated with manure spreading, and addi-
tional variable costs (AVC) for soil testing and
savings.
2
Aggregate agri-environmental payments for
adopting environmentally benign crop (AEPrj) and
animal (AEPri) production practices are constrained
by an exogenously determined budget (B), where B
takes on values of $0, $250 million, and $1 billion.
Crop producers are paid according to net environ-
mental benefits generated from changing farm
management practices. These benefits are broadly
calculated to account for potential pollutant loading
reductions to surface and groundwater (nutrients,
pesticides, and sediments), reduced wind erosion,
increased carbon sequestration, and increased soil
productivity.
The model is solved iteratively for the imposition
of nutrient standards and the use of agri-environ-
mental payments. Because agri-environmental
payments are not provided for land retirement
under our assumptions, acreage responses occur in
the first stage, where the imposition of nutrient
standards is modeled. In the second stage, the
model is reevaluated in the presence of the agri-
environmental payments, holding the acreage
response constant.
3 Agri-environmental payments
to livestock and poultry producers are assumed to
offset fixed and variable costs of nutrient stand-
ards.
4
Transportation costs are a function of the dis-
tance traveled and the quantity and type of manure
transported. We use conventional estimates of com-
mercial spreading and hauling charges (Spread and
Haul) for tons of manure produced (Ton) by animal
species within each region, as derived from Borton
et al. (1995); Pease, Pelletier, and Kenyon (2001);
and Fleming, Babcock, and Wang (1998):
(2a)  TCr' j
j
Tonjr×(Spreadjr% Disr×Hauljr),
where Dis is the average distance greater than a
mile traveled to spread manure. To calculate the
regional distance per affected AFO, we modify the
Fleming, Babcock, and Wang methodology for
search acreage:




where Acr is the total acres available for spreading
manure, which is a function of the nutrient standard
and the endogenous crop acreage choice (xactri);
γ0(0,1] describes the spatial concentration of
affected CAFOs within a region; and TO is the total
number of AFOs in that region. Here, γ approaches
one as the number of affected AFOs within a region
increases, effectively centralizing the location of
affected operations toward the middle of the region.
This, in effect, addresses the land competition effect
by allowing the search algorithm to capture the
greater distance needed to spread manure from a
few highly concentrated operations. Because the
farm production regions are already large, transpor-
tation of manure is assumed to occur only within a
region.
The nutrient standards (1b) require the sum of
each manure nutrient generated by animal produc-
tion activity j within region r (man$nutjrƒ) to be less
than or equal to the product of the regional substi-
tution rate and agronomic crop nutrient demand
2  We do not include all the costs livestock and poultry producers might
face as they adjust to meet nutrient standards. Additional costs might
include relocation costs, and investments in new storage and handling
infrastructure.
3  Additional acreage responses due to agri-environmental programs
may occur at the farm level. However, due to the regional scale of our
model, we are unable to portray these adjustments here.
4  At lower budget levels, EQIP payments to livestock and poultry pro-
ducers are subsumed by increases in fixed and variable costs of compli-
ance on CAFOs. We incorporate the effect of high conservation budgets
by assuming additional AFOs will voluntarily meet nutrient standards
using EQIP payments (AFO scenario).96   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(Ag$nutrƒ), where ƒ indexes nitrogen and phos-
phorus, respectively. Estimates of available manure
nutrients by animal type are net the losses attribut-
able to prevailing storage and handling technology
(Kellogg et al., 2000). Agronomic demand is
calculated using crop uptake values for nitrogen
and phosphorus, accounting for losses due to denitri-
fication, subsurface flow, runoff, and leaching. The
affected AFO portion of available manure gener-
ation for each region and species is represented by
θjr. Note that man$nutjrƒ and Ag$nutrƒ are endoge-
nously determined given optimal levels of animal
and crop production.
This constrained optimization problem is simu-
lated using the U.S. Regional Agricultural Sector
Model (USMP). The model accounts for production
of major crop (corn, soybeans, sorghum, oats,
barley, wheat, cotton, rice, hay, and silage) and
confined animal (beef, dairy, swine, and poultry)
categories, comprising approximately 75% of agro-
nomic production and more than 90% of livestock
and poultry production (USDA/NASS, 1999).
The USMP is a comparative-static, spatial, and
market equilibrium model that incorporates agri-
cultural commodity, supply, demand, environ-
mental impacts, and policy measures (House et al.,
2000). This model has been applied to various
issues, such as climate change mitigation (Peters et
al., 2001), water quality policy (Ribaudo et al.,
2001; Greenhalgh and Sauer, 2003), and wetlands
policy (Claassen et al., 1998). The model permits
the agricultural sector to adjust to the nutrient
standards by substituting across production activi-
ties, and cropping and tillage practices with varying
input requirements. This substitution is facilitated
by nested constant elasticity of transformation
functions allowing for interior solutions across
activities and technologies.
Crop and animal production choices are linked to
edge-of-field environmental variables using the
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate Model
(EPIC), which uses a daily time step to simulate
weather, hydrology, soil temperature, erosion-sedi-
mentation, nutrient cycling, tillage, crop manage-
ment and growth, and pesticide movements to the
field’s edge (Mitchell et al., 1998). The transport of
nutrients, pesticides, and sediment across the land-
scape is then calibrated to U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) estimates of regional pollutant loads
(Smith, Schwartz, and Alexander, 1997).
Estimates of CAFO and AFO spreading practices
on swine operations (taken from Ribaudo, Gollehon,
and Agapoff, 2003) allow us to account for prior
land application of manure in the simulations.
Accordingly, CAFOs are assumed to spread manure
on the nearest 155 acres, and the smaller AFOs are
assumed to spread manure on the nearest 90 acres.
While these numbers are not representative of the
variety of animal operations across the United
States, we argue that these values are reasonable for
initial estimates of the environmental effects of
excess manure utilization at the Farm Production
Region scale. The above levels provide a lower
bound on the estimated benefits from meeting
nutrient standards since many livestock facilities
have little or no land on which to dispose manure.
Given the acres currently receiving manure nutri-
ents, we calculate the quantity of manure nutrient in
excess of the crop requirements on those acres.
These excess nutrients are available for potential
leaching into ground waters and/or transport across
the landscape into surface waters.
Results
We obtain results portraying a potential range of
national and regional changes in the U.S. agricul-
tural sector following the application of agri-
environmental carrots and regulatory sticks for
water quality improvement by simulating various
manure nutrient substitution rates for commercial
fertilizers. The results suggest some of the costs of
complying with nutrient standards will be passed
along to consumers through higher retail meat,
dairy, and poultry prices, with or without the pres-
ence of agri-environmental payments. In addition,
changes in crop and animal production will vary
regionally given pre-carrot and pre-stick production
levels. Changing production patterns in agriculture
will have subsequent impacts on regional water
quality depending on underlying land and water
characteristics.
Prices and Quantities
Under all scenarios, livestock and poultry prices
increase and quantities decrease (table 2). The
largest price changes occur in the poultry sector
(e.g., 6.3% increase in the price of eggs), and the
greatest production changes occur in the swine
sector (e.g., 3.2% decrease in production).
5 When
5  Price changes will also be a function of the embedded elasticities
underlying the USMP model. These elasticities are specified so that model
supply response at the national level is consistent with supply response
in the USDA’s Food and Agriculture Policy Simulator (McDowell et al.,
1989), an econometric estimated national-level simulation model of the
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Table 2. Changes in Commodity Prices and Quantities, by Scenario
 SCENARIO
 a
Description    BASE   C20   C20-25   C20-100   C30-100   AFO
Prices ($):
  Corn (bu.) 2.60 !0.04 !0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01
  Soybeans (bu.) 6.30 !0.07 !0.05 !0.04 0.01 !0.02
  Eggs (dozen) 0.69 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03
  Fluid Milk (cwt) 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Fed Beef (cwt) 335.42 1.89 1.70 0.82 0.34 0.59
  Pork (cwt) 263.00 3.84 3.87 3.61 0.77 1.62
Quantities (mil. units):
  Corn (bu.) 11,235.38 !84.32 !122.69 !158.85 !93.09 !122.13
  Soybeans (bu.) 3,245.04 35.32 17.24 !1.69 !16.95 !6.98
  Eggs (dozen) 7,585.81 !26.62 !27.98 !29.84 !9.47 !17.20
  Fluid Milk (cwt) 93,463.46 !517.48 !534.04 !542.38 !259.44 !431.41
  Fed Beef (cwt) 149.66 !3.40 !3.06 !1.47 !0.62 !1.06
  Pork (cwt) 189.82 !5.92 !5.98 !5.57 !1.19 !2.50
Note: The changes are computed relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA/World Agricultural Outlook Board,
2001).
a Definitions of scenarios are as follows: C20 represents the scenario in which crop producers meet 20% of nutrient needs with manure;
C20-25 is as C20, but with agri-environmental payments of $250 million; C20-100 is as C20, but with agri-environmental payments of
$1 billion; C30-100 is as C20-100, but when crop producers meet 30% of nutrient needs with manure; and AFO is as C30-100, but with
an additional 20% of previously unregulated manure spread according to manure standards.
agri-environmental payments increase, the indi-
vidual sectors respond differently: amplifying the
price and quantity changes in the poultry, dairy, and
swine sectors, but muting the changes in the beef
sector. When manure substitution rates increase, the
impacts of nutrient standards on market conditions
are lessened.
While price and production changes are examined
in 10 major U.S. crop categories, our presentation
is restricted to the largest two: corn and soybeans.
The accompanying price and quantity changes for
these crop sectors are not as large (less than 2%
across all scenarios) nor as general as are those for
the animal sectors. This is in part due to the dual
role of cropland as a sink for manure nutrients and
a source of feed grains for livestock and poultry
operations. This sink role creates an incentive to
plant crops that consume relatively high quantities
of phosphorus (assuming the phosphorus constraint
is the more limiting nutrient).
For example, note that the quantity of corn
produced falls, as does its price under the C20 and
C20-25 scenarios. This market outcome occurs be-
cause the derived demand for corn as an ingredient
in feed rations decreases more than the increase in
demand for corn acreage as a means of disposal.
The relatively large decrease in pork production, a
major user of corn, lends support to this result. In
addition, corn production is associated with relative-
ly high levels of sediment discharge, and increasing
payments to crop producers in exchange for adopt-
ing environmentally benign production practices
induces a movement away from corn rotations. This
supply response to agri-environmental payments in
turn lessens the decline in the price for corn. Con-
versely, even though the price of hay falls, produc-
tion increases. One explanation for this result is that
hay is a relatively high consumer of (i.e., sinks for)
phosphorus, which outweighs the reduction in
derived demand for hay as a source of feed.
Regional Responses
Under most of the simulated scenarios, planted crop
acreage declines marginally across the regions (less
than 1%); however, cropland acres increase in
the Southeast, Appalachia, and Pacific regions
(table 3). These responses reflect an increase in
demand for nutrient sinks in these regions, confirm-
ing our expectation that those regions with rela-
tively high levels of manure generation per acre of
cropland would experience the greatest changes in
production. For regions in which livestock and
poultry production increase under the C20 scenario,
an initial increase in agri-environmental payments
(C20-25) would further increase production. If98   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review





 a BASE   C20   C20-25   C20-100   C30-100   AFO
Crops (mil. acres):
  Northeast 14.34 !0.08 !0.08 !0.08 !0.04 !0.06
  Lake 38.10 !0.35 !0.35 !0.35 !0.14 !0.25
  Corn Belt 99.04 !0.50 !0.50 !0.50 !0.20 !0.34
  Northern Plains 72.79 !0.37 !0.37 !0.37 !0.15 !0.25
  Appalachia 18.33 1.74 1.74 1.74 0.66 1.24
  Southeast 7.57 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.37 0.77
  Delta 17.39 !0.10 !0.10 !0.10 !0.04 !0.08
  Southern Plains 31.73 0.21 0.21 0.21 !0.02 !0.04
  Mountain 28.26 !0.08 !0.08 !0.08 !0.04 !0.06
  Pacific 9.86 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.27 0.42
  Total United States 337.42 2.03 2.03 2.03 0.67 1.36
Confined Livestock & Poultry (mil. animal units):
  Northeast 2.45 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.12
  Lake 6.07 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.18 0.31
  Corn Belt 11.06 1.47 1.48 1.48 0.34 0.72
  Northern Plains 16.93 0.24 0.82 0.77 0.24 0.35
  Appalachia 8.93 !3.52 !3.58 !3.58 !0.97 !1.81
  Southeast 0.46 !0.13 !0.13 !0.13 !0.04 !0.09
  Delta 0.45 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03
  Southern Plains 10.23 0.11 !0.20 !0.18 !0.03 0.08
  Mountain 6.54 !0.05 0.26 0.23 0.11 0.11
  Pacific 3.81 !0.87 !0.90 !0.90 !0.34 !0.59
  Total United States 66.93 !1.90 !1.35 !1.42 !0.43 !0.78
Note: The regional changes are computed relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA/World Agricultural Outlook
Board, 2001).
a States comprising the USDA Farm Production Regions are as follows: Northeast = CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT;
Lake = MI, MN, WI; Corn Belt = IA, IL, IN, MO, OH; Northern Plains = KS, ND, NE, SD; Appalachia = KY, NC, TN, VA, WV;
Southeast = AL, FL, GA, SC; Delta = AR, LA, MS; Southern Plains = OK, TX; Mountain = AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY; and
Pacific = CA, OR, WA.
b Definitions of scenarios are as follows: C20 represents the scenario in which crop producers meet 20% of nutrient needs with manure;
C20-25 is as C20, but with agri-environmental payments of $250 million; C20-100 is as C20, but with agri-environmental payments of
$1 billion; C30-100 is as C20-100, but when crop producers meet 30% of nutrient needs with manure; and AFO is as C30-100, but with
an additional 20% of previously unregulated manure spread according to manure standards.
agri-environmental payments further increased (a
movement from C20-25 to C20-100), production
would begin to fall. The opposite response occurs
in those regions where animal production initially
falls following the imposition of the initial nutrient
standard (C20).
It seems counterintuitive that providing agri-
environmental payments to crop, livestock, and
poultry producers, all else constant, would lead to
lower animal production. One explanation for this
result is that the agri-environmental payments to
crop producers for the adoption of environmentally
benign production systems might induce movement
toward crop rotations not demanding large amounts
of phosphorus and nitrogen. Movement to these
alternative crop mixes would serve to make the
nutrient application standards more difficult to meet
for those affected AFOs, essentially decreasing the
availability of manure nutrient sinks. However, at
higher levels of agri-environmental payments, crop
producers appear to be adopting management prac-
tices, such as residue management, which do not
focus as much on crop rotations. Hence, the produc-
tion responses are marginal.
Sector Responses
The changes in national-level prices and quantities
translate into differing regional responses as ex-
pected. Corresponding adjustments in net returnsJohansson and Kaplan A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Environmental Improvement   99
Table 4. Regional Changes in Agricultural Net Returns, by Scenario ($ millions)
USDA Farm
 SCENARIO
Production Region BASE   C20   C20-25   C20-100   C30-100   AFO
Crops:
  Northeast 1,100.01 !22.46 !3.37 27.29 41.81 51.48
  Lake 3,267.23 !90.60 6.55 138.19 170.15 174.31
  Corn Belt 16,399.14 !429.36 !205.14 70.52 314.78 228.11
  Northern Plains 5,119.94 !52.43 33.70 187.93 226.47 220.03
  Appalachia 1,824.90 15.22 !17.29 13.74 94.28 67.14
  Southeast 593.68 44.79 18.31 16.13 46.49 35.75
  Delta 806.23 !11.71 17.10 68.64 79.27 87.12
  Southern Plains 1,221.11 8.73 39.39 101.11 132.53 149.73
  Mountain 1,610.96 6.00 23.71 55.27 66.49 67.73
  Pacific 792.62 !65.03 !37.84 19.18 83.30 61.19
  Total United States 32,735.82 !596.85 !124.86 698.01 1,255.57 1,142.58
Livestock & Poultry:
  Northeast 3,709.48 460.34 461.78 460.91 133.35 228.10
  Lake 3,973.47 457.55 466.19 485.44 110.32 195.99
  Corn Belt 3,608.07 770.20 779.30 796.34 128.26 325.47
  Northern Plains 3,212.53 133.52 188.19 354.05 !7.55 48.31
  Appalachia 3,183.93 !38.22 !40.99 !28.14 !6.96 !49.28
  Southeast 3,008.05 !624.87 !636.70 !650.02 !133.96 !429.62
  Delta 2,334.03 341.30 339.09 339.57 61.27 171.41
  Southern Plains 3,641.18 239.72 205.74 146.18 79.93 177.44
  Mountain 2,310.30 173.86 200.82 278.34 73.12 101.15
  Pacific 4,490.48 !1,105.51 !1,105.57 !1,096.42 !487.88 !651.45
  Total United States 33,471.53 807.88 857.85 1,086.23 !50.10 117.51
Notes: The regional changes are computed relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA/World Agricultural Outlook
Board, 2001). Refer to table 3 (footnotes a and b, respectively) for listing of states comprising the USDA Farm Production Regions and
definitions of scenarios.
are not as straightforward. At lower manure sub-
stitution rates, the price impacts are sufficient to
compensate aggregate decreases in livestock and
poultry production (table 4). Nationally, net returns
increase with increasing agri-environmental pay-
ments. When manure substitution rates are at 30%,
the price effect no longer dominates the production
(and carrot) effect, and national net returns to animal
production fall. However, by increasing the scope
of the stick (the AFO scenario), the price effect in
conjunction with higher levels of agri-environmental
payments results in increasing net returns (over
the BASE scenario) for the livestock and poultry
sectors.
The crop sector results are nearly opposite of the
livestock and poultry sector results. Initially, aggre-
gate net returns fall due to the decrease in prices,
which are relatively larger than the increase in total
acreage planted. However, as agri-environmental
payments increase or as manure substitution rates
increase, the change in crop returns becomes posi-
tive. Note that, under our assumptions, the agricul-
tural sector as a whole might experience increases
in net returns by amounts greater than the agri-
environmental budget.
This finding does not suggest all sectors or
regions will share in these increased returns. Taking
a closer look at the 10 regions, we observe that in
many instances net returns fall as the carrot grows
and the scope of the stick widens. Falling net
returns for livestock and poultry production are
especially evident in the Southeast, Appalachia, and
Pacific regions, and do not seem to be affected by
increasing availability of agri-environmental pay-
ments. Actually, initial offerings of agri-environ-
mental payments appear to lead to marginally lower
net returns—indicating, in these regions, the agri-
environmental incentives to produce crops using
systems that consume relatively fewer nutrients are
greater than the incentives to provide animal pro-
ducers with nitrogen and phosphorus sinks. Even
at high levels of agri-environmental payments, net100   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
returns to animal production in the Southeast con-
tinue to fall.
Based on these results, a question is raised about
the overall impact of agri-environmental payments
on net returns when prices are allowed to adjust.
The transfer efficiency for animal production is less
than 60% under the various scenarios, implying that
even though animal producers are assisted in com-
plying with nutrient standards by agri-environmental
payments, the subsequent price effects mute the im-
pact of carrots on net returns. Initially, the transfer
efficiency for livestock and poultry producers is
only 33%. Specifically, under C20-25, a $150 mil-
lion (i.e., 60% of $250 million) transfer to livestock
and poultry producers to assist in compliance results
in an increase in net returns of $50 million. This
transfer efficiency rises to 51% under C20-100,
when an additional $450 million in agri-environ-
mental payments are allocated to livestock and
poultry producers.
Conversely, the transfer efficiency of agri-envi-
ronmental payments to crop producers is much
higher than for animal producers incorporating
price adjustments, exceeding 100% in our policy
scenarios. Under C20-25, a transfer of $100 million
to crop producers results in a more than fourfold
increase in net returns (i.e., from !$596.85 million
to !$124.86 million). An additional transfer of $300
million in agri-environmental payments to crop pro-
ducers under C20-100 results in a gain of $573.15
in net returns, a transfer efficiency of 191%.
In looking at the national totals for both crop and
animal sectors, a $250 million investment in our
agri-environmental program yields an increase in net
revenues of more than $700 million when coupled
with the regulatory stick at the lower manure sub-
stitution rates. These estimates include the potential
savings in commercial fertilizer costs, potential costs
incurred in meeting nutrient standards and in provid-
ing agri-environmental benefits, potential impacts of
price and production changes, and transfer effects of
agri-environmental payments. At the higher budget,
national net returns increase by more than $1.7 bil-
lion for agriculture as a whole. At higher manure
substitution rates and when more AFOs meet nutri-
ent standards (i.e., C30-100 and AFO), increases in
net returns are not as high as under the C20-100
scenario, yet they still exceed $1 billion.
Environmental Impacts
The use of EPIC allows us to examine the environ-
mental implications resulting from our carrot-and-
stick scenarios. In particular, we estimate the poten-
tial quantity of nitrogen discharged into surface and
groundwater (table 5), and the potential quantities
of three additional contaminants discharged into
surface water—phosphorus, sediment, and pesticides
(table 6).
The potential changes in the discharge of nitro-
gen to surface waters and leaching of nitrogen to
groundwater listed in table 5 reveal some unintended
effects of our carrot-and-stick scenarios for improv-
ing water quality. Across all regions and scenarios,
the amount of nitrogen discharged to surface waters
falls from the pre-carrot-and-stick scenario. Nation-
ally, these reductions range from 10% to 16%.
Increasing the scope of the stick and the size of the
carrot leads to larger reductions, although greater
manure substitution rates mute this response.
Nitrogen leaching increases under the C20 sce-
nario, but falls with increasing agri-environmental
payments and increasing manure substitution. A
broadening of the scope of the stick from the BASE
scenario to C20, or from C30-100 to AFO, results
in a more binding nutrient standard, creating an in-
centive to expand cropland acres and adjust acreage
share in favor of crops that consume relatively more
nutrients and leach more nitrogen, particularly in
the Southeast, Appalachia, and Pacific regions.
Because the phosphorus constraint is more binding
than the nitrogen constraint, crop producers will
have to supplement the new cropping patterns with
additional commercial nitrogen fertilizer, which
serves to undermine the reductions in manure pro-
duction.
For example, a closer examination of the poten-
tial adjustments occurring in the Pacific region
reveals a general expansion in crop production
across the scenarios, especially in corn and hay
production. Both of these crops exhibit relatively
high levels of nitrogen leaching. Furthermore, in
areas of California, the potential expansion in crop-
land and in cotton, rice, and barley production
results in elevated levels of nitrogen leaching.
Nevertheless, the nitrogen prevented from reaching
surface waters is of a greater magnitude than the rel-
atively small increases in nitrogen leaching across
all regions and scenarios. Overall, the reduction in
nitrogen discharged to ground and surface waters
ranges from 6.2% to12.6%.
As for other measures of potential water quality
impairment (table 6), changes in phosphorus load-
ing are observed to follow the same pattern as nitro-
gen discharged to surface water, with reductions
in phosphorus ranging from 24.8% to 37.6%. TheJohansson and Kaplan A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Environmental Improvement   101
Table 5. Regional Changes in Nitrogen Discharge, by Scenario
USDA Farm
 SCENARIO
Production Region BASE   C20   C20-25   C20-100   C30-100   AFO
Runoff into Surface Water (mil. lbs.):
  Northeast 193.69 !21.98 !25.49 !29.08 !27.74 !28.37
  Lake 393.99 !40.26 !48.12 !59.09 !54.31 !56.48
  Corn Belt 1,525.23 !50.14 !152.14 !180.70 !169.57 !175.51
  Northern Plains 440.14 !38.83 !46.71 !55.27 !49.80 !52.16
  Appalachia 358.14 !54.68 !60.28 !76.25 !79.10 !76.93
  Southeast 182.57 !53.46 !54.78 !55.80 !64.28 !58.42
  Delta 252.56 !12.08 !15.58 !21.01 !25.45 !26.45
  Southern Plains 266.41 !12.82 !17.51 !23.66 !27.00 !32.04
  Mountain 162.54 !44.08 !45.60 !47.86 !46.83 !47.19
  Pacific 170.05 !77.45 !77.80 !79.17 !81.16 !80.21
  Total United States 3,945.31 !405.78 !544.02 !627.88 !625.24 !633.77
Leaching into Groundwater (mil. lbs.):
  Northeast 130.01 !1.33 !3.61 !8.13 !5.63 !6.71
  Lake 357.33 !12.35 !30.97 !51.60 !38.97 !44.49
  Corn Belt 234.60 !1.39 !8.12 !13.55 !12.49 !12.84
  Northern Plains 112.65 !1.18 !4.66 !9.97 !8.44 !9.13
  Appalachia 401.53 35.27 29.10 18.14 2.90 11.19
  Southeast 182.63 19.40 16.46 14.10 2.40 10.44
  Delta 141.20 !2.28 !8.60 !16.46 !13.52 !14.85
  Southern Plains 62.90 0.80 !2.22 !6.26 !8.00 !8.69
  Mountain 31.48 !0.12 !1.37 !2.88 !2.35 !2.55
  Pacific 54.98 17.67 11.95 1.84 !6.24 !2.76
  Total United States 1,709.32 54.49 !2.04 !74.77 !90.34 !80.39
Notes: The potential regional changes are computed relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA/World Agricul-
tural Outlook Board, 2001). Refer to table 3 (footnotes a and b, respectively) for listing of states comprising the USDA Farm Production
Regions and definitions of scenarios.
results indicate that increasing the scope of the
stick, the size of the carrot, and the manure substi-
tution rates all contribute to reduced phosphorus
discharge. However, as with nitrogen leaching, the
quantities of sediment and pesticides discharged
into surface waters increase in the absence of agri-
environmental payments. As agri-environmental
payments increase, loadings of sediment and pesti-
cides fall. The change in soil erosion ranges from
!0.7% to 6.7%, and pesticide-loading change ranges
from !0.9% to 5.5%.
Soil erosion is greatest at the lower manure sub-
stitution rate under the smaller stick (C20-100). That
is, by relaxing the constraints on spreading manure
nutrients (moving from C20-100 to C30-100), less
land leaves production in regions with decreased
crop production (e.g., the Corn Belt) and less land
comes into production in regions with increased
crop production (e.g., the Pacific). The relative
changes in soil erosion rates across these regions
would result in an additional 330,000 tons of sedi-
ment being discharged under C30-100 relative to
C20-100. The amount of pesticide discharged to
surface waters declines with increasing agri-environ-
mental payments, with increasing acceptance of
manure nutrients, and with an increasing scope of
manure nutrient standards for AFOs. These reduc-
tions range between !0.9% under the C20 scenario
and 5.5% under the AFO scenario.
Summary of Agricultural Sector Analysis
A number of efforts at the local, state, and federal
levels aim to reduce potentially adverse impacts of
agricultural production on the environment in gen-
eral and on water quality in particular. Some trends
that are illustrative of these efforts include carrot
approaches (the increased level of support in recent
Farm Bill legislation for crop, livestock, and poultry
producers to implement environmentally benign
production practices) and stick approaches (the
recently promulgated rules for manure nutrients102   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 6. Additional Regional Changes to Surface Water Quality, by Scenario
USDA Farm
 SCENARIO
Production Region      BASE     C20    C20-25    C20-100    C30-100     AFO
Phosphorus Discharge (mil. lbs.):
  Northeast 17.73 !1.17 !1.32 !1.42 !3.62 !4.42
  Lake 27.67 !3.38 !3.40 !3.33 !8.20 !9.95
  Corn Belt 130.04 !9.61 !17.94 !19.91 !33.55 !35.96
  Northern Plains 38.25 !9.34 !9.72 !9.57 !11.57 !12.82
  Appalachia 56.33 !27.98 !28.40 !29.42 !28.44 !30.34
  Southeast 32.32 !14.23 !14.33 !14.45 !12.03 !14.52
  Delta 23.22 !2.44 !2.67 !2.93 !4.35 !5.66
  Southern Plains 30.62 !5.84 !6.40 !7.36 !7.23 !9.53
  Mountain 20.33 !10.93 !10.69 !9.87 !11.14 !12.33
  Pacific 17.83 !12.96 !12.98 !13.01 !11.66 !12.89
  Total United States 394.35 !97.88 !107.83 !111.26 !131.78 !148.42
Sheet and Rill Erosion (mil. tons):
  Northeast 7.84 !0.04 !0.25 !0.46 !0.42 !0.44
  Lake 20.30 !0.22 !0.65 !1.24 !1.02 !1.13
  Corn Belt 101.87 !0.67 !8.45 !10.68 !9.80 !10.28
  Northern Plains 14.85 !0.19 !0.62 !1.04 !0.83 !0.92
  Appalachia 12.08 1.04 0.74 !0.48 !0.38 !0.35
  Southeast 12.12 1.41 1.33 1.23 0.32 0.94
  Delta 9.72 !0.05 !0.18 !0.34 !0.26 !0.30
  Southern Plains 17.47 0.25 !0.11 !0.65 !1.07 !1.23
  Mountain 12.01 !0.01 !0.20 !0.59 !0.46 !0.51
  Pacific 4.55 0.06 0.02 !0.02 !0.04 !0.02
  Total United States 212.81 1.58 !8.36 !14.27 !13.95 !14.21
Pesticide Discharge (mil. TPUs):
 a
  Northeast 8,538.50 !49.00 !131.70 !268.80 !201.10 !230.80
  Lake 27,216.50 !354.50 !877.60 !1,451.50 !1,151.90 !1,292.60
  Corn Belt 102,671.10 !938.30 !2,062.00 !3,168.40 !2,332.20 !2,675.30
  Northern Plains 21,573.80 !534.60 !454.10 !344.20 !32.30 !178.30
  Appalachia 24,024.00 253.60 !142.90 !739.90 !678.70 !636.00
  Southeast 17,847.10 908.00 823.30 704.80 142.90 524.50
  Delta 61,899.20 !67.80 !376.00 !271.00 !115.80 !162.80
  Southern Plains 103,245.70 588.90 !5,094.30 !20,305.40 !21,047.50 !25,177.90
  Mountain 108,813.30 !1,028.90 !2,526.60 !3,939.60 !3,112.50 !3,502.50
  Pacific 54,172.60 5,933.10 5,954.20 6,017.40 2,738.90 4,219.00
  Total United States 530,001.80 4,710.50 !4,897.70 !23,766.50 !25,790.20 !29,112.70
Notes: The potential regional changes are computed relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA/World Agricul-
tural Outlook Board, 2001). Refer to table 3 (footnotes a and b, respectively) for listing of states comprising the USDA Farm Production
Regions and definitions of scenarios.
a TPUs refer to “toxicity persistence units” (Barnard et al., 1997). As a point of reference, the number of TPUs in a pound of DDT = 4,443
million and in a pound of Borax = 103,872.
generated on CAFOs). This study analyzes potential
economic and environmental implications of these
carrot-and-stick approaches to improving the qual-
ity of U.S. water resources. In addition, we consider
how the willingness of crop producers to substitute
manure nutrients for commercial fertilizers might
influence the changes brought about by carrot-and-
stick policies. These parameters form the basis of
six potential scenarios depicting how agri-environ-
mental payments, the scope of manure nutrient
standards, and manure substitution rates might
evolve in the United States.
First, we compare results when no payments or
nutrient standards exist with the scenario whereJohansson and Kaplan A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Environmental Improvement   103
crop producers are willing to meet 20% of their
crop nutrient demand using manure (BASE to C20).
Building on this scenario, the effect of providing
agri-environmental payments to crop and livestock
producers is evaluated, somewhat akin to the Envi-
ronmental Quality Incentives Program. By increasing
the budget from $0 to $250 million to $1 billion,
the carrot effect is investigated (scenarios C20 to
C20-25 to C20-100). Two additional scenarios are
then examined to see how increasing manure substi-
tution rates and coverage of nutrient standards might
differ from our earlier results (C30-100 and AFO).
A wealth of regional- and sector-level results
emerge from these scenarios, illustrating how agri-
environmental policies might affect agricultural
production and improve water quality in the United
States. In general, carrots and sticks result in
decreasing levels of animal production, increasing
levels of crop production, and increasing prices for
livestock and poultry products. In particular, poultry
and dairy products could see substantial price in-
creases when the willingness of crop producers to
substitute manure nutrients remains low. Never-
theless, adverse impacts on net returns to both crop
and animal producers can be mitigated by providing
increasing agri-environmental payments.
For example, without agri-environmental pay-
ments (C20), six of ten regions experience decreas-
ing net returns to crop production; however, by
including $400 million in agri-environmental pay-
ments for crop producers (C20-100), all regions
experience increasing net returns to crop production.
For those regions that experience adverse impacts
on net returns to animal production (the Southeast,
Appalachia, and Pacific), it appears the willingness
of crop producers to substitute manure nutrients has
the most bearing on reducing these losses. Because
net returns for crop producers also increase with
increasing manure substitution, use of carrots to
induce crop producers to utilize more manure nutri-
ents may represent an avenue for future inquiry.
Results indicate agri-environmental payments
can offset some unintended consequences of the
nutrient standards on water quality. Specifically, by
requiring certain AFOs to spread manure nutrients
at no greater than agronomic rates, there is potential
in some regions to increase both nitrogen leaching
to groundwater and increase discharge of sediment
and pesticides to surface water due to changing
crop levels and composition. However, when agri-
environmental payments to crop producers are used
to encourage the adoption of environmentally be-
nign production practices, the subsequent reductions
in cropland loadings offset any potential increases
induced by the nutrient standards. Overall, nitrogen
discharge to ground and surface water might fall by
as much as 12.6%, phosphorus discharge by more
than 30%, sheet and rill erosion by 6.7%, and pesti-
cide discharge to surface waters by more than 5%.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to place
a value on the benefits of these reductions, findings
suggest coordinating agri-environmental payments
and manure spreading regulations can significantly
enhance water quality in the United States.
Aggregate analysis of the U.S. agricultural sector
cannot reveal how individual operations would ben-
efit or suffer from these trends. However, if only
the largest animal feeding operations meet nutrient
constraints, the costs of compliance would fall on
CAFOs and the benefits from secondary price
effects will accrue to smaller AFOs. When crop
producers’ substitution rates for manure nutrients
remain at or near current levels (i.e., a 20% substi-
tution rate), the secondary price effects are suffi-
cient to compensate much of the livestock and
poultry sectors for the costs of meeting nutrient
standards. However, at higher manure substitution
rates, the increased costs of transporting manure,
manure testing, soil testing, and developing a
manure management plan outweigh compensating
price effects and foregone commercial fertilizer pur-
chases, resulting in reduced net returns for the live-
stock and crop sectors. Also, at higher manure substi-
tution rates, consumers benefit from lower price
increases and greater increases in water quality.
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